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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 Jamil Murray entered a plea of guilty to drug 
distribution offenses, pursuant to a plea agreement that 
preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  He now appeals the denial of that motion, arguing 
that the District Court erred when it failed to suppress 
evidence that law enforcement officers obtained as a result of 
their entry into a motel room that he had rented, but that was 
occupied by a third party.  Because the Court correctly 
concluded that the officers did not violate the Fourth 
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Amendment when they entered the motel room or when they 
frisked Murray upon his entry into the room, and because the 
Court’s factual findings with respect to consent were not 
clearly erroneous, we will affirm. 
I. 
 The facts as found by the District Court are as follows.  
On August 16, 2010, Officer David Clee of the Bensalem 
Township Police Department was investigating a report of 
suspected prostitution at the Sunrise Motel, one of a series of 
motels along Route 1 in Bensalem.  An owner told Officer 
Clee that he believed prostitution was taking place in his 
motel, and that he had seen a woman he believed to be a 
prostitute being picked up by a green Cadillac.  Later that 
day, Officer Clee learned that a “tip” had been called in by a 
woman named “Jessica Brown,” stating that a man named 
“Mills” was at the nearby Knights Inn, was in possession of 
drugs, and was driving a green Cadillac.   
 
 That evening, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Officer Clee 
and Corporal Adam Schwartz observed a green Cadillac 
parked outside another nearby motel, the Neshaminy Motor 
Inn.  They learned that the car was registered to Room 302, 
which had been rented by one Jamil Murray.  The officers 
knew, from their investigation of the “tip” earlier in the day, 
that Murray had rented two rooms at the Knights Inn, Rooms 
157 and 158, paying cash, and they had seen a copy of 
Murray’s driver’s license on file at the Knights Inn.   
 
 Corporal Schwartz knocked on the door to Room 302.  
A woman wearing lingerie (later identified as Jessica Burns) 
answered the door, and asked Schwartz if he was “looking for 
a date.”  He responded “no.”  The officers then proceeded to 
the Knights Inn, where they saw the green Cadillac parked in 
front of Room 158.  They observed a woman leaving Room 
158, and saw Murray inside the room.  
 
 The officers returned to the Neshaminy Motor Inn, and 
Corporal Schwartz again knocked on the door to Room 302.  
Burns told him that she was busy, and to go away.  Officer 
 4 
 
Clee then knocked, and when Burns told him, too, that she 
was busy, he identified himself as a police officer and asked 
her to open the door.  He also knocked on the window, and 
showed his badge to Burns through the window.  She opened 
the door. 
 
 The officers asked if they could come in, and Burns 
allowed them to do so.  Burns told the officers that she was a 
prostitute and that she worked for the person who had rented 
the room, a drug dealer that provided her with drugs.  
Although she did not then tell the officers, she later testified 
that she had made the earlier 911 call using the alias “Jessica 
Brown,” and that she had called because she felt she was in 
danger.   
 
 While the officers were interviewing Burns, there was 
a knock at the door.  Believing that it was another police 
officer, the officers allowed the door to be opened.  Murray, 
whom the officers recognized from their investigation, came 
into the room.  Corporal Schwartz patted him down, and 
Murray allowed the officers to remove items from his pockets 
and a lanyard from around his neck.  They found a cell phone, 
a large sum of cash, and hotel room keys that, it was later 
determined, were keys to Rooms 157 and 158 at the Knights 
Inn.  Murray attempted to flee, but was ultimately arrested. 
 
 The evidence that the officers obtained from Room 
302—Burns’ statements and the evidence taken from 
Murray’s person—were used to obtain search warrants, 
including warrants for searches of Rooms 157 and 158 at the 
Knights Inn, and the Cadillac.  In Room 157, officers found 
192.4 grams of crack cocaine.   
 
II. 
 Murray was charged in a superseding indictment with 
conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine, 
possession of crack cocaine, and other offenses.  He moved to 
suppress the evidence that resulted from the encounter in 
Room 302 and argued that the evidence seized from Room 
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157 and pursuant to other warrants should also be suppressed 
as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”   
 
 At the suppression hearing, Burns testified that she had 
no problem with the officers entering the room, and that she 
was “happy that they came and that they [were] there” and 
“wanted to open the door” because she had called earlier for 
help.  Murray testified that he was not asked for, and did not 
provide, consent to the removal of items from his person.   
 
 The District Court denied Murray’s motion, finding 
Burns’ testimony to be credible and determining that she had 
common authority, or, in the alternative, apparent authority, 
to consent to the officers’ entry into Room 302, and that her 
consent was voluntary.  The Court also found that the frisk of 
Murray was lawful and supported by reasonable suspicion 
that he was armed and dangerous, and that he consented to 
the seizure of items from his person.  It determined, as well, 
that the warrants obtained for other locations were based on 
probable cause and did not include evidence that had been 
unlawfully obtained.   
 
 On the eve of trial, Murray entered a plea of guilty to 
the drug-related offenses pursuant to a plea agreement.  In the 
agreement, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining 
charges, and Murray preserved his right to appeal the denial 
of his suppression motion.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), the government agreed to 
recommend a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment, 
followed by 120 months’ supervised release.  At sentencing, 
the District Court imposed the recommended sentence.  This 
appeal followed. 
 
III. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  United States v. Golson, 743 F.3d 44, 50 (3d Cir. 
2014).  “We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual 
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determinations but exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s application of law to those facts.”  United States v. 
Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
 “[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in 
fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, 
express or implied, is a question of fact,”  Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), which we review for 
clear error.  United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  A factual finding is clearly erroneous  
“when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States 
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see United 
States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 427 (3d Cir. 2015).   
 
IV. 
 On appeal, Murray contends that Burns lacked 
common or apparent authority to grant access to Room 302, 
and was coerced into doing so.  He also contends that the 
officers illegally frisked him and that any consent to the 
seizure of evidence from his person was coerced.  He, thus, 
concludes and argues to us that Burns’ statements, the 
evidence seized from his person, and the evidence seized at 
the other locations, was all “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
flowing from the officers’ unlawful entry into Room 302.   
 
 A. Consent to Enter Room 302 
 “When ‘the Government obtains information by 
physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a 
“search” within the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’”  Florida v. 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (citing United States 
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012)).  Here, although the 
officers did no more than enter Room 302 and speak with 
Burns, we analyze their conduct as a “search” for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment because they were gathering 
information in an area in which Murray had a legitimate 
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expectation of privacy, and did so “by physically entering and 
occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicitly or 
implicitly permitted” by him.  See id. (holding that bringing a 
drug-sniffing dog onto a homeowner’s porch constituted a 
search).  The District Court found, and the parties do not 
dispute, that Murray had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in Room 302.  See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 
(1964).   
 
 While the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures, “[c]onsent is an exception to the 
‘requirements of both a warrant and probable cause.’”  
Stabile, 633 F.3d at 230 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219).  
“[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over 
premises or effects is valid as against the absent, 
nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.”  
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1973).   This 
concept of “common authority” rests on the principle that one 
“assume[s] the risk” that a co-inhabitant “might permit the 
common area to be searched.”  See id. at 171 n.7.  “Common 
authority” is defined as “mutual use of the property by 
persons generally having joint access or control for most 
purposes.”  Id.; Stabile, 633 F.3d at 230-31.  When an 
individual possesses only apparent, rather than actual, 
common authority, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if 
the police officer’s entry is “based upon the consent of a third 
party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably 
believe to possess common authority over the premises, but 
who in fact does not do so.”  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
177, 179, 188-89 (1990).   
 
 The District Court correctly concluded that Burns had 
common authority over Room 302 or, in the alternative, 
apparent authority.  The facts as known to the officers at the 
time they entered Room 302 warranted a reasonable belief 
that Burns was a prostitute who had access to and control 
over the room for most purposes.  Earlier, she had asked 
Corporal Schwartz if he was “looking for a date,” and prior to 
the officers identifying themselves as law enforcement, she 
denied them entry to the room, saying that she was “busy.”  
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(See App. 4.)  It was reasonable for the officers to believe that 
Burns was in control of who would be permitted to enter the 
room, a belief reinforced by the fact that, later, Murray 
knocked before entering.   
 
 The fact that the officers knew the room was registered 
to Murray does not render Burns’ consent invalid, because 
she had common authority—or, at a minimum, apparent 
authority—over the room.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Caldwell, 518 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2008) (consent to 
search hotel room was valid when one co-occupant 
consented); United States v. Rodriguez, 414 F.3d 837, 844 
(8th Cir. 2005) (consent to search motel room was valid when 
defendant’s girlfriend consented, although defendant had 
registered and paid for the room); United States v. Morales, 
861 F.2d 396, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1988) (consent to search car 
was valid when provided by the driver, although the car had 
been leased by another person who was present, but silent).  
When Murray granted Burns access to and control of Room 
302, he assumed the risk that she could—and would—permit 
others, including law enforcement, to enter the room when he 
was not present.1  
 
 Murray argues that Burns was coerced into opening 
the door and permitting the officers to enter Room 302.  We 
conclude, however, that the District Court did not clearly err 
                                                 
1 Murray attempts to analogize the facts of this case to those 
in which an employee, such as a housekeeper, babysitter, or 
handyman, is present in an employer’s home to perform 
specific work, with only temporary access to and control over 
the premises.  This case, of course, involves neither a home 
nor an ordinary household employee.  The nature of Burns’ 
employment pre-supposed that she would allow third parties 
to enter the room, and the facts known to the officers—
including evidence that Murray was involved with 
prostitution-related activities at two other nearby hotels—
made it reasonable for them to believe that Murray had 
granted Burns access to and control over the room for the 
purpose of engaging in prostitution.   
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in finding that Burns voluntarily consented to the officers’ 
entry, in light of her testimony that she willingly allowed 
them to enter, was “happy that [the police] came and that they 
[were] there,” and “wanted to open the door.”   
 
 B. Frisk and Seizure of Items from Murray 
 Citing longstanding precedent, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Terry v. Ohio that “[n]o right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, 
than the right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.”  392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. 
R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).  Nevertheless, 
in Terry, the Court held that an officer does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment when he conducts a limited search for 
weapons, for his own protection, where there is “reason to 
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous 
individual.”  Id. at 27.  In reviewing the legality of such a 
search, we ask “whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety 
or that of others was in danger.”  Id.  In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979), the Court made clear that “a 
reasonable belief that [an individual is] armed and presently 
dangerous . . . must form the predicate to a patdown of a 
person for weapons.”  The fact that an individual is present at 
a location where a search is taking place is not sufficient 
justification for a Terry frisk:  “The ‘narrow scope’ of the 
Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less 
than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to 
be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises 
where an authorized narcotics search is taking place.”  Id. at 
94.   
 
 The District Court did not err in concluding that the 
frisk of Murray was supported by reasonable suspicion that he 
was armed and dangerous.  The officers had obtained 
evidence from Burns, supported by information from their 
investigation earlier in the day, that Murray was a drug dealer 
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who was running a prostitution operation.  In light of these 
facts, it was reasonable to suspect that Murray was armed.  
See United States v. Binion, 570 F.3d 1034, 1039 (8th Cir. 
2009) (“An officer’s reasonable belief that someone is 
involved in drug dealing can support a suspicion that the 
person is armed since weapons are often present incident to 
the drug business.”).  Corporal Schwartz’s limited intrusion 
upon Murray’s personal security was supported by reasonable 
suspicion and within the “narrow scope” of Terry.  See 
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94; Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; United States v. 
Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a 
pat-down was lawful, where an officer had testified that he 
was “concerned for his safety because persons involved with 
drugs often carry weapons”). 
 
 Murray contends, however, that the frisk was unlawful 
because Terry has no application when the police-citizen 
encounter takes place in a home.  Murray cites language from 
our opinion in United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 258 (3d 
Cir. 2002), in which we observed that Terry “has never been 
applied inside a home.”  That case, however, dealt with 
markedly different facts. There, an officer entered a home, 
arrested an individual without probable cause, and searched a 
bag.  The government attempted to justify the search of the 
bag as lawful incident to a valid Terry search.  Here, by 
contrast, the officers were lawfully present in a motel room 
(not a home) and conducted a limited pat-down search for 
weapons when Murray arrived unexpectedly on the scene 
presenting a potential threat to their safety.  In Myers, we 
acknowledged that to the extent Terry did apply, it would 
“only allow the officer to exercise control over [the 
individual] to protect himself and secure the situation.”  Id. at 
258.  This is precisely what took place in Room 302.  The 
same principles that the Supreme Court outlined Terry, and 
acknowledged in Ybarra, are at work here:  because the 
officers possessed reasonable suspicion that Murray was 
presently armed and dangerous, their limited intrusion into his 
personal security by way of a frisk for the purpose of officer 
safety did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 
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 Importantly, the items taken from Murray were not 
seized in connection with the frisk.  The District Court found, 
and we agree, that the items taken from Murray’s pockets and 
from around his neck were taken pursuant to his valid 
consent.  Although Murray testified to the contrary, Corporal 
Schwartz testified that he requested and received consent.  In 
the absence of any facts to support a “definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed,” we cannot say 
that the Court clearly erred in crediting Corporal Schwartz’s 
version of events.  See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 
N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two 
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice 
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”).   
 
V. 
 Because the District Court correctly concluded that 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation, we will affirm the 
denial of Murray’s motion to suppress.   
